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The Judges Strike Back

by David Bosco, for The Multilateralist blog on Foreign Policy on 29 Nov 2011 | Comments


The International Criminal Court is attempting to make clear that its judges—not the Libyans (and not the ICC prosecutor)—will have the final say on where Saif Gaddafi will be tried:

In accordance with Resolution 1970, adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on 26 February 2011, the Libyan authorities have the obligation to cooperate fully with the Court. On 5 July 2011, a request for cooperation with regard to the surrender of the suspect was notified, together with the warrant of arrest, to the Libyan authorities.

Should the Libyan authorities wish to conduct national prosecutions against the suspect, they shall submit a challenge to the admissibility of the case before Pre-Trial Chamber I, pursuant to articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Any decision on the admissibility of a case is under the sole competence of the Judges of the ICC.

Therefore, contrary to what has been reported in the media, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC remains seized of the case and the Libyan obligation to fully cooperate with the Court remains in force.

But note that the court’s statement is studiously silent on whether Libya can make that admissibility challenge while holding Saif or whether it must turn him over first.

More: If the ICC judges are looking for documentary evidence that Libya is currently unable to conduct a trial of Saif on its own, they can turn to the UN Secretary General’s new report (h/t Denis Fitzgerald):

While political prisoners held by the Qadhafi regime have been released, an estimated 7,000 detainees are currently held in prisons and makeshift detention centres, most of which are under the control of revolutionary brigades, with no access to due process in the absence of a functioning police and judiciary. Sub- Saharan Africans, in some cases accused or suspected of being mercenaries, constitute a large number of the detainees. Some detainees have reportedly been subjected to torture and ill treatment. Cases of individuals being targeted because of the colour of their skin have been reported. There have also been reports of women held in detention in the absence of female guards and under male supervision, and of children detained alongside adults.

Original article:
http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/28/the_judges_strike_back?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter?page=full


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Bensouda vs. Othman for ICC Prosecutor (and Bensouda Should Win)

by Kevin Jon Heller, Opino Juris on 29 Nov 2011 | Comments


by Kevin Jon Heller

The ICC has announced that the Assembly of States Parties has eliminated Andrew Cayley and Robert Petit from consideration as Moreno-Ocampo’s replacement:


The Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court (“the Assembly”) will hold its tenth session at the United Nation Headquarters in New York from 12 to 21 December 2011.
The tenth session will be marked by elections, which will significantly change the composition of the Court. The Assembly will elect a new President of the Assembly of States Parties for the tenth to twelfth sessions (2011 – 2013). Ambassador Tiina Intelmann (Estonia), was recommended for the post by the Bureau in July. She will replace Ambassador Christian Wenaweser (Liechtenstein).

The Assembly will further elect the Prosecutor who shall hold office for a term of up to nine years and shall not be eligible for re-election. As mandated by the Rome Statute, every effort shall be made to elect the Prosecutor by consensus. The four shortlisted candidates recommended by the Prosecutor Search Committee are: Ms. Fatou Bensouda (Gambia), Mr. Andrew T. Cayley (United Kingdom), Mr. Mohamed Chande Othman (United Republic of Tanzania), and Mr. Robert Petit (Canada).

After informal consultations among States Parties, it was decided to narrow the list to two candidates: Ms. Fatou Bensouda (Gambia) and Mr. Mohamed Chande Othman (United Republic of Tanzania). At the 1 December informal consultations, to be held in New York, States Parties will see if there is consensus on one candidate.

I am surprised that Cayley was eliminated — I think he would have made an excellent Prosecutor.  But, of course, it was always unlikely that a non-Africa
n candidate would be elected, especially when the final list included two Africans who were very well qualified for the position.

That said, I still think Fatou Bensouda is the clear choice for the next Prosecutor.  She offers the best of both worlds: an ICC insider who offers institutional continuity, which will be critical in the coming years, but has a strong, independent voice that has not been tainted by Moreno-Ocampo’s incompetent tenure.  Having spoken to numerous individuals involved in the ICC, from OTP staff to legal officers in Chambers to defense attorneys, it is clear that Bensouda was the primary reason that the OTP didn’t fall completely apart over the past eight years.

I have also had the good fortune to spend time with Bensouda over the past couple of years.  She is, to put it mildly, an incredibly impressive woman: smart, articulate, thoughtful (a welcome change from Moreno-Ocampo), and compassionate.  And her pre-ICC credentials are stellar, including significant posts at both the international level and in her native The Gambia:


Senior Legal Adviser at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); Legal Adviser and Trial Attorney at the ICTR; Attorney General and Minister of Justice of the Republic of The Gambia; Solicitor General and Legal Secretary of the Republic of The Gambia; and Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions of the Republic of the Gambia.

Othman also has excellent credentials — although his role as Prosecutor General of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) has to count against him somewhat; the Special Panels for Serious Crimes were a fisaco.  But there is only one clear choice for the next Prosecutor, and that is Fatou Bensouda.
Fingers crossed.  We should know in early December.

Original article here:
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/11/29/bensouda-vs-othman-for-icc-prosecutor-and-bensouda-should-win/


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Fatou Bensouda- the favorite for next ICC Prosecutor
Fatou Bensouda- the favorite for next ICC Prosecutor

 

Letter from New York: No outsourcing for Libyan justice

by TALAL AL-HAJ on 28 Nov 2011 | Comments


On November 21, a small number of journalists at the United Nations were chosen to take part in a conference call with U.S. Permanent Representative Ambassador Susan Rice from Malta, her first stop after her a one day visit to Libya. I was one of these journalists. It was clear to me that day that the one question on everybody’s mind, was whether Seif al-Islam Qaddafi would be handed over to the International Criminal Court to face charges of committing crimes against humanity or if he would be tried by a national court in Libya and possibly face the death penalty if convicted. The ICC does not impose the death penalty, even for the worst of crimes, be it war crimes, crimes against humanity or even genocide.

During the “on the record” telephone briefing, we learned from Dr. Rice that the ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo would be arriving to Libya on November 22 to discuss the way forward in regard to Seif al-Islam and possibly Abdullah al-Senoussi, about whom, Dr. Rice informed us, that the reports of his capture were apparently at the time premature.

We have since learned from informed Libyan sources that Ocampo met with the chairman of the National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Libya’s interim Prime Minister Abdel-Rahim al-Keeb and finally Mohamed al-Alaqi, who at the time held the NTC justice portfolio. Our sources informed us that Ocampo soon came to realize that the Libyans are determined to hold Seif al-Islam’s trial on Libyan soil.

Ocampo, accompanied by Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and one or two of his senior advisors, then concentrated on explaining the ICC’s procedures to the Libyan representatives, which enable high level Libyan officials to implement their plans, to try Seif al-Islam inside Libya, while respecting their obligations under international law, thus showing the world that today’s Libya is a country that respects and abides by international laws and standards.

Of course the ICC is able to try Seif al-Islam in Libya, if they so decide, with the agreement of the Libyan authorities. Article 62 of the Rome Statute allows the court to decide on another venue for holding a trial. The article states that the venue of a trial shall be the seat of the Court, unless otherwise decided. I am sure that we all agree that the most important aspect to consider is that justice is served and seen to be served, regardless of the trial’s location, be it Tripoli or The Hague.

Needless to say that there are many international human rights organizations that argue against holding any trials inside Libya for Seif al-Islam or for that matter Senoussi and others, arguing that the accused will not have fair trials in Libya. Add to that the refusal of nearly all international human rights organizations to accept the imposition and implementation of the death penalty, regardless of the crime.

Nevertheless, the Rome Statute is based on the principle of the ICC being complementary to national criminal jurisdictions, something that is stated clearly in Article 1 of the Rome Statute, the treaty by which the ICC was established. This simply means that national courts have precedence over the ICC to conduct trials for a national or for an individual over whom they have jurisdiction, unless the State concerned is “unwilling” or “unable” to genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution (Article 17, paragraph (a) of the Rome statute).

The phrase “unwilling” means that the state would conduct the trial, only to shield the accused from justice, which is definitely not the case here. The phrase “unwilling” also includes any unreasonable delay, like for example in waiting for ever and ever to try the accused, which is also not the case here. Actually I expect the Libyans to get very active and conduct a first hearing of the charges by the end of the year. They might even conduct it by mid- December, knowing that the ICC judges will begin year-end judicial recess on December 16. Under “unwilling”, the Libyan national authorities must also demonstrate that they will not practice any unfair procedures that may infringe on the right of the accused and due process.

As for the phrase “unable”, it means that the national authority has no national judicial system or that the judicial system has totally or substantially collapsed. “Unable” can also mean that the judicial system is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence.

Now that the ICC has issued, in June of this year, arrest warrants against Seif Al-Islam and Senoussi, the Libyan authorities will have to convince the Pre-Trial judges that the arrest warrants are inadmissible since the Libyan state is “willing” and “able” now to try the two accused. There is no reason to doubt that they are not willing and able, right from the outset. But this is a process and not a yes/no question. The Libyan government will have to agree to send a delegation to The Hague to demonstrate to the Pre-Trial Chamber headed by Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng of Botswana, that their judicial system will follow fair procedures and that their government will undertake to stay engaged with these judges, updating them on the process as necessary as the trial progresses. In short “the end of the process” is what matters and not “its beginning”, according to a well-placed ICC source.

The Libyan government will have to hold the trials on the same charges that Seif al-Islam was accused of by the ICC in June, namely committing crimes against humanity. Even though the Libyan penal code may not include crimes against humanity, it could be argued that prosecuting Seif al-Islam for the crimes of murder, torture and so forth could be a sufficient substitute for prosecuting crimes against humanity. It could be argued as well that the Libyans could prosecute Seif al-Islam for crimes against humanity under customary international law, even if crimes against humanity are not on the national books. The Libyans can also add other charges to the list of international charges against Seif al-Islam and try him for them.

There is little reason to think that the judges would not approve the Libyan request, but it is a decision for them and them alone. In 2010 the Kenyan government tried the same tactic of the “admissibility challenge”, but was defeated when the Pre-Trial Judges refused their request, considering it far from being a serious request, and insisted on the ICC trying the accused. However in the case of this potential challenge from the Libyan government, once presented, it is hard to envisage that the Pre-Trial Judges would reject it. Indeed it could be the first successful challenge to ICC jurisdiction based on “admissibility”.

During his visit to Libya, ICC Prosecutor Ocampo did say that Seif al-Islam could potentially be tried in Libya. “They want to show the world that this is a serious country with smart people and they can do a good job. It’s an issue of national pride. I think you should not distrust them so easily,” he added.

Indeed it is a matter of national pride, but add to that the Libyan new government wants to be seen by the international community as a fair and capable government, worthy of conducting fair and just trials for Seif al-Islam, Sanoussi and others, especially given that there are others for whom Tripoli has already issued arrest warrants and who are sheltering, for the time being, in neighboring countries, such as Saadi Qaddafi who was granted asylum in Niger.

The Libyans wish neither to be seen as a vengeful government nor as a government that outsources one of the biggest challenges to the Libyan justice system to an outside supplier, albeit one as independent and impartial as the International Criminal Court. How they maintain this balance and whether they are up to this challenge, remains to be seen.

(The writer is New York and United Nations Bureau Chief of Al Arabiya. He can be reached at talal.alhaj@mbc.net). Read original article here.


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Credit: Sabri Elmhedwi / European Pressphoto Agency
Credit: Sabri Elmhedwi / European Pressphoto Agency

 

Fun with Complementarity

by Kate Cronin-Furman on 25 Nov 2011 | Comments


From Wronging Rights

There is SO MUCH international criminal law news right now, you guys. Case 002 opened at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (more on that later), Bangladesh began a trial for atrocities committed during its independence fight, and George W. Bush and Tony Blair were found guilty of war crimes by a “Let’s Play Make Believe” tribunal in Malaysia.

But the biggest story is that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, both the subject of ICC warrants on crimes against humanity charges, were captured in Libya this weekend. The Libyan authorities have expressed a very strong desire to try Saif themselves and a reluctance to hand him over to the ICC, so ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo headed down to Libya yesterday to talk things out.

As far as I can tell, it was at that point that every news media outlet in the world began misreporting the story. So, uh, note to Al Jazeera, The Guardian, MSNBC, Voice of America, and the rest of y’all: Moreno-Ocampo most certainly did not agree that the Libyans will try Saif. You know how I know this, despite my lack of a foreign correspondent on the ground in Tripoli? It’s because the Chief Prosecutor does not have the power to make that decision.

The new Libyan government is well within its rights to challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction if it wants to prosecute the crimes against humanity charges itself. And there’s a good chance they’d prevail on the challenge, given that the ICC’s jurisdiction is complementary, not universal. (This means that the court can only try cases where the relevant domestic judicial system is either “unwilling” or “unable” to prosecute.) However, the assessment of whether Libya is “able” to prosecute rests with the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, not with the state itself, or with the Chief Prosecutor.

This particularly legal issue hasn’t been explored before* so the Libyan case will be an exciting (maybe just for me) opportunity to establish exactly how the ICC will handle inquiries into the ability of states to try mass atrocity cases. Specifically: Will the Pre-Trial Chamber defer to state preferences and call off ICC proceedings when states show a genuine desire to conduct trials themselves, or will it conduct an extensive analysis of judicial capacity?

I suspect the bizarre reports we’re getting that the ICC has “ruled” that the Libyans can try Saif stem from the fact that the Prosecutor has opted for the former course,** and will support Libya’s efforts to try the case. We’ll see whether the judges do likewise…

*Note: The ICC did slap down a challenge to its jurisdiction from Kenya earlier this year, but it was on the grounds that the Kenyan government wasn’t conducting an investigation or prosecution on charges similar to those in the ICC case, not that it didn’t have the capacity to do so.

**Possibly in recognition of the fact that if Libya flat out refuses to hand Saif over, there’s not much the ICC can do…


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Uruguay: Expiry Law revoked

by Mariana Rodríguez-Pareja and Salvador Herencia-Carrasco on 22 Nov 2011 | Comments


For the first time, crimes against humanity that might have been perpetrated under the military government that ruled the country between 1973 and 1985 may be investigated. Law No. 18.831, allowing the judiciary to independently investigate these crimes, was adopted by the Uruguayan Parliament on 27 October.

Although there have already been some judicial investigations in Uruguay, the so-called 1986 “Expiry Law” prohibited the judiciary from administering justice in an autonomous manner. The peculiarity of the Uruguayan experience is that the Expiry Law has been submitted twice to a referendum. In 1989, the Uruguayans voted for the Law to remain into force. But in 2009 it didn’t get the majority of votes necessary to push for a reform to repeal it.

During the military dictatorship, human rights organisations estimate that approximately 213 people disappeared; around 6,000 were jailed as long-term political prisoners. The most common practices were tortures and the abduction of the children of political dissidents, who were later given to other families.

Uruguay, like Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay, was part of Plan Condor, which supported right-wing military governments in order to fight the influence of communism in South America in the ‘70’s. This regional strategy facilitated cross-border assassinations,  tortures and enforced disappearances.

The 1986 Uruguayan Expiry Law

After the return to democracy, the civil government led by President Sanguinetti, adopted in 1986 Law No. 15.848 (Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado), also known as the Expiry Law, granting amnesty to those responsible for human rights violations during military rule.

This Law declared the expiry of the State’s power to prosecute crimes committed before 1 March 1985 by military personnel or police forces during the de facto regime. The approval of this Act was also consistent with the policies and laws adopted by other countries in the region at the time which decided to approve Amnesty Laws fearing chaos or further threats to democracy after years of military dictatorships.

The difference against other Amnesty Acts adopted in the region is that under the Expiry Law, some cases could be opened if the President decided that investigations into cases of alleged abuses could be allowed to proceed.

But after the restoration of democracy, many cases were blocked, without the right to appeal. This power granted to the Executive is in direct contravention to the Uruguayan Constitution and International Human Rights Law, which embodies the separation of powers. Despite the peculiarities of the Expiry Law, de facto President Bordaberry (1973-1976), and President Alvarez (1981-1985) have been prosecuted and convicted for crimes that were not covered by the amnesty.

President Mujica, a former Tupamaro leader who was tortured and served in prison for a long term during the military regime, had previously argued publicly against scrapping the amnesty, pointing to the referendum results. Nevertheless, before the vote in Parliament, amnesty supporters and members of the Armed Forces claimed they would seek prosecution of former guerrillas, especially Tupamaros.

Revoking the Expiry Act

Uruguay’s Expiry Act violated not only the Constitution, but international human rights principles and treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. It also violates rulings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which are binding and final. Even the Uruguayan Supreme Court ruled on several occasions on the unconstitional character of the Act.
In 2006, President Tabaré Vázquez allowed an investigation into the crimes perpetrated under the military regime. Earlier this year, President Mujica, using the powers granted under the Expiry Act, decided to reopen 88 cases of human rights abuses.

Turning point

However, the decisive turning point came in February, when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Gelman Case, determined that the 1986 Expiry Law had no legal effectvis-à-vis the American Convention on Human Rights, ordering Uruguayan authorities to strike down any internal measures that could represent an obstacle to investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity, especially enforced disappearances.

The adoption of Law No. 18.831 represents a major change in the national prosecution of crimes against humanity in Uruguay. For the first time, the judiciary is in charge of leading these proceedings, leaving all political considerations aside. Due to the fact that only those cases considered as crimes against humanity can be reopened, no statutory limitations or other measures that may halt proceedings are applicable.

Families of the victims are celebrating the adoption of this law as one step closer to knowing the truth about their loved ones. This new development in Uruguay shows that despite the challenges and limitations - the constitutional standing of human rights treaties, the rulings of the Inter-American Court and its interpretation by national courts - can bring about positive change and consolidate the rule of law.

—-

Mariana Rodriguez Pareja is a Communications Expert and Human Rights Advocat- based in Buenos Aires. Twitter: @maritaerrepe

Salvador Herencia Carrasco. LL.M. University of Ottawa, Legal adviser of the Andean Commission of Jurists, based in Lima.

Originally published by Radio Netherlands. View the original post here.


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Decision Time for Libya and the ICC

by Julian Ku, Opinio Juris on 20 Nov 2011 | Comments


by Julian Ku

Reports are a little uncertain, but it sounds like Libya will not comply with the ICC Prosecutors’ arrest warrant and turn over Muammar Qaddafi’s son Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi.

ZINTAN, Libya (AP) – Libya’s new leaders said Sunday they will try Moammar Gadhafi‘s son at home and not hand him over to the International Criminal Court where he’s charged with crimes against humanity. The government also announced the capture of the toppled regime’s intelligence minister, who is also wanted by the court.

As I suggested in an earlier post, Libya does have an obligation under UNSC Res. 1970 to cooperate with the ICC Prosecutor, and this obligation probably includes the obligation to turn over alleged war criminals.  To be sure, Libya might be able to avoid the obligation to surrender Seif Qaddafi if it tries Seif Qaddafi itself, which it says it is planning to do. But there is a good argument that it has to turn him over first, and then file a challenge to the admissibility of the case on the grounds that it is now willing and able to try Seif Qaddafi himself. This is a procedural point, but an important one. And since Libya apparently has no real court system, there is little chance of them getting him back once they turn him over. So it is not surprising they will hold on to their prisoner, and start the bargaining process with the ICC and the UNSC.

Original article here.


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A Call to Conscience: Forever Despair in Iraq?

by Nadine Mansour on 18 Nov 2011 | Comments


As 2011 nears its end, the U.S. plan to withdraw troops from Iraq is being instated. The 2003 invasion and occupation, implemented under false claims that Iraq held “weapons of mass destruction” and termed “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is finally coming to an end. Ostensibly, Iraqis should by now be enjoying their freedom, their decentralized neoliberal economy, and the reconstruction policies that have been put in place by the transitional government. The U.S mission is over, but the entire country has been deinstitutionalized, sectarian violence has been exacerbated, and cities like Fallujah still face the possible consequences of radioactive weapons used in 2004 and the grave aftermath of human rights violations by the U.S. military.

The Iraqi nation has been subjected to years of sanctions that started even before the invasion in 2003. The sanctions where initially justified upon claims that Saddam was building nuclear weapons and were supposed to target Iraqi infrastructure to encourage the Iraqi population to push for regime change. When this failed, the U.S. took action into its own hands, in 2003 invading the country and capturing Saddam. The former dictator’s downfall, while ending years of brutality, was not an organic movement and only foreshadowed the problems to ensue with the introduction of “freedom” from abroad. It is important to note that the iconic destruction of Saddam’s statue was actually carried out by American soldiers, an image in stark contrast with the effacing of Mubarak’s portraits from all public spheres in Egypt and the Libyan physical rejection of Qaddafi’s green flag.

The issue of U.S. and NATO intervention is hard to tackle. On the one hand, the intervention was legal, based on the unanimous UN Security Council resolution 1973 to implement a no-fly zone and inhibit the aerial attacks by Qaddafi’s regime. It is claimed that such action helped speed up the Libyan democratic movement. On the other hand, the intervention did not leave Libya unscarred: thousands have been killed by NATO airstrikes, and now the country is dealing with battles between the revolutionary and pro-regime forces. Hilary Clinton’s take on the U.S.’s involvement (upon receiving news of Qaddafi’s death by an aide between formal interviews) was “We came, we saw, he died”. This unofficial statement reveals the dangers of the imperial approach taken by a democratic nation like the U.S.

For almost a decade now, language and connotations of freedom used by the American media have tried to portray the Iraq war as positively as possible, in order to justify and necessitate the U.S.’s presence on the ground. But the U.S. occupation was perhaps most memorably rejected when an Iraqi journalist hurled his shoe at George W. Bush in 2008. “This is from the widows, the orphans and those who were killed in Iraq,” the journalist, Muntadhar Al Zeidi, announced.  While this effort portrays an utter rejection of the U.S. invasion and then reform policy (across the Arab world, the sole of a shoe, when not being used for its primary purpose, symbolizes a downright insult), Bush nonchalantly claimed that such behavior was an indication of one’s freedom of expression under a “free society”. This was an effort, once again, to achieve a positive portrayal of U.S. involvement.

Where the toppling of Saddam differs from the most recent uprisings in Egypt or Tunisia is that it was imposed from outside. Along with the Iraqi coup came the installment of neoliberal economic policies and a U.N. food-for-oil programme meant to fund humanitarian aid but which essentially inhibited local economic growth by imposing the sale of foreign products and which also saw an inadequate response to civilian deaths, famine, and medical needs. In The Forever War by former NYTimes reporter and current writer for the New Yorker, Dexter Filkins, a scene of the wreckage of a U.S. army-built park in Iraq is yet another symbol of the rejection of U.S. imposed forms of freedom, for what significance does a plot of grass and a few benches have in the midst of the reality of an entire country that has faced hundreds of thousands of deaths, a certain passivity on the part of the international world, infrastructural depletion, and humiliation? While the “forever war” in Iraq is now seemingly coming to close, an entire chapter dealing with the war’s aftermath will be the sole burden of the Iraqi people for years to come.

As the Arab democratic movements continue, it is important not to neglect Iraq in the regional movement toward social equality and human rights. In some Arab countries, we have seen protestors chant for Palestine, and in Egypt, citizens stormed the Israeli embassy to show their disapproval of Israel’s policies. Because the U.S’s eight-year occupation of Iraq has not been able to achieve justice in Iraq, it is important to bring Iraq back into the larger picture of the regional struggle to oust dictatorial regimes. It is our duty not to put this episode behind us and instead to become aware of the extent of the devastation of war in Iraq in order to move beyond the current state of despair.

Suggested Reading:
Dexter Filkins, The Forever War
Sponeck et al, Reforming UN sanctions in the shade of Iraq: Targeting regimes, sparing civilians, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies

Suggested Films:
Fallujah: A Lost Generation
Fallujah, The Hidden Massacre


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UN should establish a global fund for justice

by James A. Goldston for Open Society Institute/Guardian on 16 Nov 2011 | Comments


The ICC may be here to stay, but more than words are needed to protect our growing system of international law

In September, Kenya’s TV stations replaced their afternoon fare of wall-to-wall soap operas with something new - coverage of pretrial hearings at the international criminal court (ICC), involving six leading Kenyans accused of orchestrating brutal communal violence after the elections of 2007.

Thousands watched as ICC prosecutors in The Netherlands questioned the accused - including a deputy prime minister, the head of the civil service and a former national police chief. Whatever the outcome - and there have surely been some missteps - the ICC cases are providing Kenyans with the fullest public examination yet of what happened. To date, they are the only serious attempt to prosecute those responsible.

From Kenya to Yemen and from Sri Lanka to Syria, “The Hague” has come to inspire hope among victims of violence who increasingly see the ICC as a necessary backstop when national court systems cannot, or will not, address mass atrocities. As a result, despite widespread criticism of its performance, and the fact that many major powers - including China, India, Russia and the United States - have yet to join, the ICC is likely here to stay.

But the same cannot be said for many other arms of the system of international justice that has developed over the past six decades.

We are talking of the assemblage of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies that take standards like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and regional conventions and charters, and apply them in concrete cases.

Courts in Africa, the Americas and Europe, together with United Nations “treaty bodies,” oversee state conduct. International criminal courts adjudicate individual responsibility for the most serious crimes. Though different in many ways, all these institutions share the common goal of combating impunity for breaches of human rights and/or humanitarian law. Thus, states have supported - or so we were led to believe - not just the idea of the law, but its operation in practice.

But sadly, states are increasingly reneging on their commitments. Under the radar, governments have in recent years aggressively pushed back against institutions whose job it is to deliver justice for victims of gross abuse.

This spring, the Southern African Development Community - a grouping of 15 states - closed down its regional court, following protests by Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe that its judges were impeding his government’s land reform program by ordering compensation for former landowners.

Mugabe was not alone in thinking courts should do his bidding. A minister of justice from a neighboring country reportedly said, regional courts “serve us, they are for us.” In West Africa, Equatorial Guinea has threatened to pull out of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a regional judicial body that considers rights complaints from throughout the continent, should it deign to hear a human rights case against it’s leader, President Teodoro Obiang.

The human rights treaty bodies of the United Nations - legal experts who consider individual complaints - issue “views” but cannot effectively follow up. As a result, they are often ignored. A recent study by my organisation, the Open Society Justice Initiative, concluded that, of more than 500 cases in which the UN Human Rights Committee has found violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, fewer than one fifth have received a satisfactory response. Many states never respond.

Governments don’t like independent judges telling them what they can - and can’t - do. The effort to build on the work of the African Commission by creating a separate African court of human and peoples’ rights, capable of issuing binding judgments, moves slowly; so far only five governments have accepted its jurisdiction over individual complaints.

Even the European court of human rights - which has the longest history and the most substantial financial backing from its membership - struggles to get states to do what it says. By the end of 2009, more than 7,500 decisions were still awaiting implementation. In Russia, petitioners who dare take the government to Strasbourg have been beaten, kidnapped and even killed. Elsewhere, though filing a lawsuit won’t likely result in violence, hostility to European judges abounds.

Four years after the European court outlawed racial segregation, Roma children throughout the Czech Republic are still condemned by the thousands to dead-end, separate schools.

In Britain, prime minister David Cameron recently pronounced himself “physically sick” over a Strasbourg court ruling granting convicted prisoners the right to vote.

Nor are United Nations-backed tribunals immune from government intransigence. The extraordinary chambers in the courts of Cambodia - which is designed to bring to account those most responsible for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge - has been stymied as senior government officials publicly refuse to “allow” certain prosecutions to proceed and withhold the testimony of witnesses Phnom Penh would rather not be heard.

All these courts are places of last resort. They serve as safeguards to - but do not replace - domestic courts, which retain primary responsibility for redressing serious rights violations. And yet, in situations where national courts cannot or will not function, supra-national judges play a critical role in standing up for the rule of law.

In the absence of such institutions, many victims of war crimes from Chechnya to the Congo would have nowhere to turn.

Even in countries where, thankfully, armed conflict is not present, these courts address discrimination against women and minorities, restrictions on speech by journalists and ordinary citizens, and bias or political interference in civil and criminal proceedings. Where domestic courts lack independence and opportunities for peaceful dissent are few, a regional judicial forum may offer the only opportunity to get a fair hearing.

And while far more is needed to ensure state compliance with decisions, the importance of a simple declaration by a duly constituted body that the law has been broken, and a right violated, should not be underestimated. “This shows we were right,” one client proudly told me when informed of a favorable ruling by the European court. “No one can take that away from us.”

The political challenges to the courts are aggravated by a chronic lack of financial resources. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a notoriously under-funded body empowered to adjudicate alleged rights violations on the continent, has not published any judgments in more than a year, in part due to its lack of capacity.

It’s not as if the budgets for these bodies are exorbitant. The African Commission’s 2011 budget is less than $10 million. The cost for the Inter-American Court is on the order of $20 million annually. The annual budget for each of the UN treaty bodies—dealing with torture, the rights of children, the rights of women, and other matters—is between $10 and $20 million. These costs compare favorably with those of some domestic proceedings (the UK’s Bloody Sunday inquiry into a notorious incident of police violence in Northern Ireland exceeded 100 million pounds).

But funding justice makes sense. If justice for victims and commitment to the rule of law are not sufficient reasons, the cost of unremedied abuses to good governance and global development should be. Injustice without remedy can lead to violence and instability. As a recent World Bank report concluded, poverty rates are 20% higher in countries affected by repeated cycles of violence. Lawyers and judges on the front end are less expensive than soldiers and peacekeepers on the back. Even in wealthier countries, over time the failure to redress rights violations corrodes public faith in government.

Last December, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon rightly warned that “international justice is under attack in many places,” and urged states to “strengthen our resolve to shut the door on the era of impunity.”

At next year’s high level UN summit on the rule of law, the secretary general should call for the creation of a global fund for justice. Like the Global Fund for HIV/Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis, the goal would be to secure a stable source of funding to address a problem - in this case, serious breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law - of concern to all humanity. By pooling resources from both private and governmental donors, and developing a resource reservoir to be tapped over several years, the fund would curb the inefficiencies, uncertainties and politicisation of the current, ad hoc system.

And Ban Ki Moon should go further. He should dedicate more UN staff to the challenge of implementing human rights rulings - so that judgments become real. He should designate a special representative to highlight the issue and report annually on states’ record of compliance. And he should convene a discussion at the next general assembly meeting of states’ obligations to provide political support for international and regional judicial institutions.

Our emerging system of global justice is under threat. The secretary general must use more than words to defend it.


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Photograph: Joshua Lott/REUTERS
Photograph: Joshua Lott/REUTERS

 

Peru: Forced- sterilization cases during Fujimori’s era will be reopened

by Julie Guillerot and Mariana Rodríguez-Pareja on 15 Nov 2011 | Comments


A new window has opened for justice and redress for victims of forced sterilization that were carried out under the administration of former President Alberto Fujimori, who served from 1990-2000 in Peru. A few weeks ago, Peru’s Attorney General José Antonio Peláez Bardales announced the reopening of these cases.

Thousands of women and men, most of them indigenous and poor, were victims of this terrible crime, perpetrated against their will and in terrible medical conditions. According to extra official reports, the Peruvian state sterilized around 300,000 women and more than 18,000 men as part of the state policy for reproductive health.

National Program for Reproductive Health and Family Planning

During the second term of Fujimori’s administration, between 1996 and 2000, voluntary contraception was one of the methods chosen within the administration’s plan for demographic control and public health.
However, the “consent” or “voluntary” part of the plan was not respected during the implementation of the program. Although officials in the Fujimori administration have stated that women and men signed consent forms prior to the practice, several NGOs have claimed that in some or most of the cases, people were forced, pressured, coerced or deceived into undergoing sterilization procedures, without prior consent. In certain instances the practice lead to death due to post-surgery complications; in others, it lead to health problems and psychological trauma, unemployment and isolation of victims from communities.

Likewise, the Ombudsman office said the national plan also breached principles of individual autonomy and the plan was deficient, infringing upon several human rights, including the rights to personal integrity, equality, freedom of conscience and religion, health, reproductive health, and ultimately life.

According to report by DEMUS, most of the victims were indigenous Andean peasants that speak Quechua, have low-levels of education, and are poor.

María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez Case and Access to Justice

Access to justice for cases of grave violations of reproductive rights (such as death and grave complications) has been deficient up to this point, as evidenced by the case of María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez (MMMC), who died in 1998 after having suffered from complications of a forced sterilization procedure. Her family brought the case to the local prosecutor’s office, but the case was archived in 1999. Despite this, her case was brought to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) in 2001, where her family and Peruvian authorities signed a Friendly Solution Agreement, by which the Peruvian state admitted its international responsibility for the crime.

The agreement was finalized in 2003 and the state committed to: investigate and sanction the acts against personal freedom, life, body and health; adopt preventive measures to avoid the repetition of these acts in the future and amend the existing laws on reproductive health and family planning, removing any discriminatory language and respecting women’s rights; among other important commitments, including adopting redress measures.

Despite these efforts and the agreement, the Peruvian state did not implement the measures, and in May 2009, the Provincial Prosecutors of Human Rights (PPHR) announced the archiving of the case, stating that these crimes are neither genocide nor crimes against humanity.  The Criminal Superior Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the PPHR ruling and rejected the request made by victims against the decision of the Prosecutor to archive the file.

Access to justice and redress was blocked at the national level; therefore, the only way to reach justice was via the IACHR.

Crime against Humanity

On 21 October 2011, the Attorney’s General Office announced the state will reopen the investigation of these facts, and that it would comply with the agreement subscribed before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. The investigations will be conducted by the Criminal Supra-Provincial Attorney’s office, which will have special jurisdiction in order to carry out investigations in all the Peruvian provinces.

For the first time, the cases of enforced sterilizations have been reclassified and will be prosecuted in Peru as crimes against humanity and not as common crimes.

International Criminal Law, specifically the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which Peru is party, establishes such violations and other sexual abuses as crimes against humanity and war crimes. According to article 7.1 (g) of the Rome Statute, enforced sterilization, among other terrible crimes, could constitute crimes against humanity if commited as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. These cases of enforced sterilization in Peru thereby meet the threshold for crimes against humanity.

Will Justice be done?

Since the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) did not examine these crimes, this recent acknowledgment by the state is very symbolic. Now, the Peruvian judiciary has the difficult task of putting an end for once to impunity for these crimes, assuring access to justice for all the victims and their families, and ordering reparations where appropriate.

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Mariana Rodríguez-Pareja is a Communications Expert and Human Rights Advocate. Twitter handle: @maritaerrepe

Julie Guillerot is Jurist from the Université de París X Nanterre and Universidad de Chile. Previously held positions include Aprodeh-Peru, Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), where she was the Program Manager in Morrocco (2009-2011).


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Honduras:  Human Rights Violations and Impunity

by Verenice Bengtsson on 15 Nov 2011 | Comments


A few weeks ago, Mariana Rodriguez Pareja and I addressed in a post for this blog the impunity situation in Honduras. The reign of impunity has led to a point where the ICC should exercise its jurisdiction without further delay; more delays in the process of justice works against the deterrent effect that the ICC should have and against its mandate, particularly given that there is no official effort to redress current impunity in Honduras.
Why is this? The institutional crisis in Honduras has rarely been so apparent as it was during and after the coup d’état on June 28, 2009. The role of tolerance and complicity played by State authorities such as the Attorney General, the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court in particular left the people defenseless, especially those who protested and continue to protest against the interruption of the democratic order.
People had nowhere to go to complain about abuses of authority or to seek protection from political persecution. This seriously affected people´s trust in the institutions, but most of all it increased the climate of violence and impunity. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) has defined impunity as follows: “the total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and conviction of those responsible for human rights violations.” 

Limited assistance, unlimited difficulties

The scarcity of economic resources in Honduras aggravates these institutional shortcomings. One of the main obstacles in the Honduran Justice System is the limited financial aid in order to fight against crime. The budgetary limitations do not allow appropriate training for personnel, acquisition of technology and logistics that are required to investigate the circumstances of the crime and to identify those responsible. The lack of an effective program to protect victims and witnesses collides with the reality in which citizens prefer to remain silent because of the risk of threats to their personal integrity, their lives or the lives of their families.
Impunity is further entrenched by the absence of political will to fight back. For instance, Honduran institutions allowed with inactivity and tolerance the crimes committed during the coup. As an effect of impunity, violations of human rights persist. Thus, the State enables persecution and violations of human rights by private persons, groups, as well as by State agents.

In two examples, the decision of the Supreme Court to dismiss the charges against the military chiefs allegedly involved in the actions in which the president Zelaya was arrested and violently expatriated to Costa Rica, and the amnesty decree approved by the National Congress, exhibit the tolerance and participation of the judicial and legislative branches.
Through this legacy of impunity, police authorities and military forces become empowered to act independently and unchecked.

More Impunity and Lack of Accountability

The International Community, in particular the Organization of American States (OAS), also have a degree of responsibility for the increase of impunity in Honduras because of their recognition of a government in which civilian and military chiefs that carried out the coup are occupying executive positions.
Early in 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights made this warning about the Honduran case, stating that, “the widespread impunity that attends human rights violations is due in part to the Supreme Court’s decisions, which undermine the rule of law.  Apart from the questionable role that the Supreme Court played during the coup d’état, since then it has acquitted the military accused of participating in the coup but has dismissed judges and magistrates that endeavored to avert the coup by democratic means.”

The Honduran authorities systematically denied and still deny the existence of human rights violations, which has resulted in inaction and tolerance of criminal activity. This context requires actions from the international community to stop impunity and legally ensure the right to justice and reparation of the victims and the right to the truth in order to prevent future violations and coups d’état in Latin America.

Who suffers? 

The violations of the right to life, personal integrity, personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, right to strike and to work, systematically affect particularly the teachers, peasants, journalists and the LGBT community. It is important to consider the extremely high amount of people who are killed in Honduras. In 2008, according to the Observatory on Violence in Honduras, 4.473 homicides were committed .  After the coup in 2009, manslaughter increased to 5,265. In 2010 the amount of homicides elevated to 6,236 . Currently 20 persons are killed every day .  Honduras’ Casa Alianza reported 805 violent deaths and/or executions of children and youths in the country during 2010. In 86% of the cases the responsible party is unknown, which indicates the degree of impunity.  According to Centro de Derechos de Mujeres (CDM), 332 femicides were committed in 2010. From January to June 2011 about 190 women have been killed.  The Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) affirms that from January 2010 to August 2011, 46 people, mostly peasants, have been killed in the conflict between businessmen and peasants in the region known as “Bajo Aguán”.  The Committee of Relatives of The Disappeared in Honduras (COFADEH) informs us that since June 2009, 15 journalists have been killed, 25 have been threatened, 4 were victims of kidnapping and torture and 37 have suffered attacks of different kinds. Since 2004 more than 50 people from the LGBT community have been killed, 34 persons of them were murdered after the coup. Of these, only 2 cases have been treated in the tribunals. This, once again, indicates the high level of impunity.

Need for Justice

The Honduran context demands of the State the implementation of policies that redistribute resources efficiently, promote solidarity, tolerance, social inclusion and the political participation of citizens.
The level of impunity is such that the state can be held responsible. When a State tolerates the impunity of serious human rights violations and interruptions to the democratic order urgent intervention by the international community is required to protect the victims and their relatives, investigate, prosecute and convict those responsible. Violence and impunity are winning in Honduras.

Put an End to Impunity

Some, though not all of the crimes listed here fall under the ICC jurisdiction, the Court must act on those crimes which do fall under its mandate.
Although primary means of justice for states are their own national justice systems, the ICC contributes to strengthening the current international justice system and the rule of law, and particularly recognizes, through the fundamental principle of complementarity, the role of states in ensuring global rule of law by investigating and trying crimes.
In a country where the judicial system seems to be unable and unwilling to investigate and prosecute the gravest crimes, the ICC- to which Honduras is a State Party- could play a vital role.
In this case, delayed international justice is no justice at all.

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Verenice Bengtsson holds a BA in Law (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras), Postgraduate diploma in Human Rights (Lund University), and is an MA Candidate (University of Malmö).


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Photo: Stephen Ferry 2009, from HRW Report, 'After the Coup'
Photo: Stephen Ferry 2009, from HRW Report, 'After the Coup'

 

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